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1. Introduction 
Satisfaction from over-the-air (OTA) broadcasts increases with contents’ variety and 
reception’s clarity. An expansion of the number of OTA broadcasters increases 
programs’ variety, but the increased spectral congestion intensifies interferences. The 
variety-congestion trade-off is the focal theme of our proposed optimal control of the 
broadcasting spectrum. Our focus on this trade-off is motivated by a brief background 
description of the OTA broadcasting industries in technologically advanced countries.  
     Due to the public good nature of OTA broadcasts and their educational, cultural 
and political impacts and because of scarce bandwidth and high sunk costs, broadcasts 
and entry rules have been tightly regulated in all major OECD countries (cf., Webbink 
1973). Until the late 1970s the television broadcasting industries in OECD countries 
comprised only a handful of licensed and highly protected public and commercial 
firms. Since 1980 alternative transmission techniques, such as satellite and cable, have 
created a more favorable environment for entry into the television broadcasting 
industry and localization of broadcasters and broadcasts. Yet the focus of the veteran 
incumbent OTA broadcasters on nation-wide audience and market shares have 
remained very high (cf., Motta and Polo, 1997; Caves, 2006). The radio broadcasting 
industries have been less concentrated and more localized, but entry to these 
industries has also remained highly regulated due to sunk costs and tight spectrum 
constraint. In many European metropolitan areas, OTA radio broadcasts are provided 
by twenty to eighty FM stations and by similar numbers of AM stations. Metropolitan 
areas in Italy offer the largest FM variety. With only fifty kHz separation between 
stations, their FM broadcasting spectrum is the most congested in Europe.  
     The intensified trade-off between variety and reception has been recently stressed 
by the Electronic Communication Committee within the European Conference of 
Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT, 2010).1
                                                 
1 "The available [FM] spectrum (20.5 MHz) constitutes a limited resource that is used intensively in 
Europe. In many countries the introduction of new FM services is difficult and may lead to an 
unacceptable degradation of existing services." (CEPT, 2010, Section 1, P. 5) … "The FM spectrum is 
in many areas overcrowded and may be reaching saturation if the high quality of reception and existing 
coverages must be retained. This results in FM services increasingly being interference-limited by 
design or otherwise and these higher interference levels may have to be accepted to allow the 
introduction of many more additional services". (CEPT, 2010, Section 2, P. 5) 
 The recent adoption 
of digital transmission technologies has expanded the scope for program variety in 
both the television and radio broadcasting industries. Digital technology is spectrally 
efficient – it can increase the number of television channels six-fold (cf., Adda and 
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Ottaviani, 2005). The adoption of digital technology by American OTA broadcasters 
in 2007 and the subsequent turning off of analogue signals in 2008 have freed a 
significant UHF space. However, the spectral gains have not relaxed the US television 
broadcasting industry’s spectrum constraint. The spectral dividend from the digital 
switchover was mainly auctioned off to large telecommunications carriers for 
accommodating the deployment of 4G mobile-phone networks. Similar diversion of 
the digital switchover’s spectral dividend is expected in other OECD countries. The 
situation is more complex for radio broadcasting as only a few countries have 
successfully adopted and rolled out digital platforms for radio transmissions, and even 
fewer have clear digital switchover plans for analogue radio broadcasting. Still, buffer 
zones between broadcasters’ bands have to be reduced in order to accommodate new 
entrants to the OTA broadcasting industry.  
     Despite the digital switchover, expansion of the OTA broadcasting industry can be 
expected to intensify the trade-off between variety and reception in the pursuit of the 
overall quality of the industry’s service. The variety-reception trade-off is likely to be 
most prominent under a deregulatory scheme that allows free entry and exit. In view 
of the recent broadcasting spectrum deregulatory trends (cf., De Vany, 1998; Hazlett, 
2008) and the variety-reception trade-off, our theoretical analysis explores the 
possibility of convergence of the number of ATO broadcasters to steady state and the 
comparative statics of the steady state when entry and exit are motivated by above-
normal profits and moderated by sunk costs. We treat the broadcasting spectrum as a 
state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. As in the case of any other state-
owned natural resource, governments are entitled to royalties on the use of spectrum. 
Hence, in addition to the direct benefits from the service provided by the broadcasting 
industry, there are indirect benefits – the public services financed by the states’ 
royalties on this natural resource.  
     We construct a conceptual framework where the state’s royalties are allowed to 
vary over time so as to maximize the sum of the discounted direct and indirect 
benefits stemming from the use of the broadcasting spectrum. The number of 
broadcasters is allowed to adjust to the above-normal profit from broadcasting at a 
rate moderated by sunk costs. The broadcasting industry’s above-normal profit is 
assumed to rise with the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service. On the one 
hand, entry increases variety, heightens competition and, in turn, raises the quality of 
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the industry’s service. On the other hand, entry increases spectral congestion and the 
intensified interferences lower the quality of the industry’s service.  
     The possible sensitivity of the consumers’ incomes to the quality of the industry’s 
service is another theme in our analysis. In constructing the optimal control model, we 
take into account two opposing effects of the quality of the service on consumers’ 
incomes. On the one hand, the information disseminated by broadcasts enhances 
knowledge, forms standards of performance, and generates transactions. On the other 
hand, broadcasts divert time from work and other modes of investment in human and 
social capitals. The higher the overall quality (variety and reception) of the industry’s 
broadcasts is, the stronger these opposing effects. The net effect of quality on the 
consumers’ aggregate income is not clear.    
     We identify the conditions that facilitate a stable path along which the number of 
broadcasters gradually converges to the steady state of a royalties-based optimally 
controlled industry and present its comparative statics. In contrast to the observed 
consolidation and return to concentration in the aftermath of deregulatory reforms in 
the United States, Italy, Germany and Japan (cf., Noam, 1992; Motta and Polo, 1997; 
Hazlet, 2005), our analysis of royalties-based optimal control of the OTA 
broadcasting industry reveals a possible convergence to a steady state with a larger 
number of broadcasters. 
     Our optimal control analysis of the OTA broadcasting industry is structured as 
follows. Section 2 presents the dynamics of the number of broadcasters. Section 3 
argues that the broadcasting industry have a multifaceted effect on consumers’ utility: 
a quality enhanced positive direct effect of the industry service, a negative indirect 
effect of the industry service through diverting budget from other goods, an unclear 
indirect effect stemming from the aforementioned opposing effects of the quality of 
the broadcasting industry’s service on the consumers’ aggregate income and budget, 
and a positive effect of the spectrum royalties paid by the industry on the provision of 
public goods. These utility aspects and the OTA broadcasting industry’s dynamics 
described in section 2 are incorporated into the construction of the public planner’s 
optimal control problem in section 4. Section 5 analyzes the possibility of 
convergence of the industry’s trajectory to steady state. Section 6 presents the 




2. Industry Dynamics 
Let n(t) denote the number of suppliers (broadcasters) of OTA transmitted programs 
(broadcasts) at time t. At every instance t each broadcaster uses a single channel and 
delivers a single program. Let the broadcasters be technologically and location-wise 
identical and paying royalties, r(t), to the government for using a channel (spectrum 
band) at t. Also let the width of each band be technologically determined and fixed, 
ω , and the bands evenly spread along a fixed homogeneous spectrum space set aside 
for the broadcasting industry, Ŝ . In which case, the bands shift, and the buffer zones 
between them is evenly reduced, as the number of broadcasters increases. For 
tractability, let us further assume that the consumers of the OTA broadcasting 
industry’s service are located at an identical, physically unobstructed, distance from 
the broadcasters; i.e., along a flat circle with the broadcasters at its centre. Then all the 
broadcasts are equally receivable by all the consumers. We assume that the consumers 
of the broadcasting industry’s service are also users of broadcast time. In addition to 
watching and/or listening to programs, they advertise their services during the 
programs. The consideration of consuming-using agents simplifies the analysis which, 
more generally, could have considered the demands of three types of agents: 
consumers only, users only and consumer-users.  
     Broadcasters enter (exit) the industry as long as the above-normal profit (ANP) per 
broadcaster from broadcasting is positive (negative). That is,   
n(t) ANP(t)= φ ,          (1) 
where 0φ >   reflects  the speed of adjustment (ease of entry and exit). Sunk costs 
(i.e., the fixed costs associated with facilities, equipment and knowledge that are not 
transferable to other industries) deter entry and exit. The larger the broadcasters’ sunk 
costs are, the lower the speed of adjustment of the number of broadcasters to the 
above-normal profit from broadcasting. For simplicity, the sunk costs are assumed to 
be time-invariant and, consequently, φ  is taken to be a scalar. With Ŝ  denoting the 
fixed amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry, ˆn(t) (0,S / )∈ ω .  
     From the perspective of the consumers, the overall quality of the aerially 
transmitted programs, Q(t), rises with variety and reception. While the variety of 
programs is increasing with the number of channels, interferences intensify as the 
buffer zones between the channels diminish. As the buffer zones are evenly reduced, 
reception is positively related to the size of the unused spectrum (S), which is: 
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ˆS(t) S n(t)= −ω .          (2) 
Consequently, the quality of the aerially transmitted broadcasts is taken to be given by 
an implicit form 
ˆQ(t) q(n(t),S(t)) q(n(t), (S n(t)))= = −ω        (3) 
that has the following properties:  
i. ˆq(0,S) 0= ; 
ii. the direct, variety, effect of the number of channels on quality, is positive but not 
increasing, nq 0>  and nnq 0≤ ; 
iii. the indirect effect of the number of channels on quality (through deteriorating 
reception) is negative, as sq 0>  and (for simplicity) unchanged ( ssq 0= ), and is 
equal to sq−ω ; and  
iv. up to a critical number of channels, n  ( ˆ0 n S /< < ω ), the positive variety effect 
dominates the negative interference effect: n n sQ q q 0
>
<
= −ω =  for n n
<
>
=  . 
     The overall demand for broadcasts increases with quality. Consequently, the 
broadcasting industry’s aggregate revenue from advertisements and subscription fees 
(in the case of pay TV) is, at any t, R(Q(t)) with R(0) 0= , QR 0>  and, for 
tractability, QQR 0= . Assuming that consumers do not have favourite channels, the 
industry’s aggregate revenue is equally distributed.  
     We consider some computationally convenient specifications of q and R. In 
particular, we specify the overall quality of the service of the OTA broadcasting 
industry for the consumers to be given by:    
ˆQ(t) n(t)[S n(t)]= −ω                      (4) 
where, as indicated by equation (2), Ŝ n−ω  is the size of the unused spectrum set 
aside for broadcasting. This parabolic specification of Q reflects properties that can be 
resulted from the opposite effects of n on variety and reception: n ˆQ S 2 n 0
>
<
= − ω =  as 
ˆn S / 2
<
>
= ω  and nnQ 2 0= − ω< . With this convenient specification ˆn 0.5(S / )= ω . That 
is, the marginal effect of the number of OTA broadcasters on the overall quality of the 
service of the OTA broadcasting industry is initially positive, but when more than half 
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the spectrum’s carrying capacity is used the negative congestion effect dominates the 
positive variety effect on the quality of the industry’s service.  
     We assume that the marginal revenue (i.e., increment in revenues from 
subscription fees and commercial advertisements) from quality of service is constant 
(p) and, for simplicity, also time-invariant. That is, p can be interpreted as the price of 
broadcasts’ quality for consumers. In which case, the OTA broadcasting industry 
revenue function is: 
R(t) pQ(t)= .           (5) 
By substituting the right-hand side of Eq. (4) for Q into this specification of R, the 
industry’s revenue function is: 
2ˆR(t) pSn(t) p n(t)= − ω .                       (6) 
     For simplicity, the instantaneous operational cost (c) of each channel and the 
(foregone) normal profit per agent attainable in other industries (π ) are taken to be 
time-invariant.  Consequently, the industry’s above-normal profit per broadcaster is 
ANP(t) R(t) / n(t) (c r(t))= − + π+                               (7) 
and, in recalling (1) and (6), the change in the number of broadcasters at t is 
ˆn(t) [(pS p n(t)) (c r(t))]= φ − ω − + π+ .       (8)     
This motion equation suggests that a one and for all increase of the royalties charged 
on bands used by an initially stable industry ( n =0) reduces the above-normal profit 
and, subsequently, the number of broadcasters. In turn, the variety of programs is 
reduced, but the reception of each broadcast is improved. If the former (latter) effect 
dominates the latter (former), the industry’s overall revenue decreases (increases), the 
number of broadcasters decreases (increases), and so on and so forth until the above 
normal profit is completely diminished. The following section considers the 
consumers’ utilities and let the royalties charged on bands be chosen by the public 
planner so as to maximise the sum of the discounted consumers’ utilities over an 
infinite planning horizon, subject to the number of broadcasters’ motion equation (8).  
 
3. Consumers’ utility  
The consumers are taken to have an aggregate income, Y(t), of which  R(Q(t)) is 
spent on access to, and advertisements in, the OTA broadcasts and the remainder, 
Y(t)-R(Q(t)), on private goods. Broadcasts have two opposing effects on aggregate 
income. On the one hand, they disseminate information that enhances knowledge, 
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forms standards of performance and generates transactions. On the other hand, they 
divert time from work and active investment in human and social capitals. These 
opposing effects are intensified by the quality of the broadcasts. With 1 0ϕ >  
indicating the information dissemination effect, 2 0ϕ >  the production-effort 
diversion effect of broadcasts, and  Ŷ 0>  the aggregate income attainable when the 
said effects offset one another (or nil), the consumers’ aggregate income is: 
1 2
ˆY(t) Y ( )Q(t)= + ϕ −ϕ .                                      (9) 
     With (9) and the explicit specifications (4) and (5) of the broadcasting industry’s 
quality of service and revenue, and with 0α >  indicating the consumers’ direct 
marginal instantaneous utility from the quality of the broadcasts and 0β >  their 
marginal instantaneous utility from the private goods, the consumers’ instantaneous 
utilities from the quality of the broadcasts ( 1u ) and from consuming the private good 
( 2u ) are: 
2
1




ˆˆu (t) {Y ( p)[Sn(t) n(t) ]}= β + ϕ −ϕ − −ω .               (11) 
The royalties paid by the broadcasters at t, n(t)r(t) , are immediately directed to 
finance public services. The consumers derive instantaneous utility ( 3u ) from the 
investment of the spectrum’s royalties in the provision of public goods. The following 
explicit form ensures diminishing positive marginal utility from the public goods and 
also concavity in the control variable g of the Hamiltonian associated with the public 
planner’s optimal control problem described in the following section: 
3u (t) (n(t)r(t))= γln                              (12) 
where 0γ > .  




u(t) u (t) u (t) u (t)
ˆŶ [ ( p)][Sn(t) n(t) ] (n(t)r(t)).
= + +
= β + α +β ϕ −ϕ − −ω + γln
                   (13)  
As there is no strong interaction between public goods’ consumption and private 
goods’ consumption, the assumed separability of the utilities derived from these 
consumptions is sensible. In justifying the assumed separability between the utilities 
generated from the use of the broadcasting service and from the rest of the private 
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good consumption, we stress that these service and private good consumption are 
aggregates and that the sign of the cross derivatives of a utility function defined on 
these aggregates is not clear. Some components of the broadcasting service are 
substitute to some components of the consumer’s aggregate consumption of the rest of 
the private goods, but complementing others. For example, watching OTA broadcast 
sport competitions complements the use of some household’s facilities and utilities 
and the consumption of home-made food’s ingredients, but substitutes attendance of 
sport competitions, use of transportation and stadium related services and 
consumption of fast food. For this reason, and for tractability, the cross derivative is 
assumed to be nil. Under the said specification, the consumers’ marginal 
instantaneous utility from the number of broadcasting channels is:  
n 1 2
ˆu (t) [ ( p)][S 2 n(t)] / (n(t)= α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ .               (14) 
Recalling that Ŝ 2 n 0− ω =  and / n 0γ > , nu 0=  for n̂ n n= + ε >   that satisfies 
1 2[ ( p)]2 / (n )α +β ϕ −ϕ − ωε = γ + ε . The only positive root for this quadratic equation 
is 2 1 20.5n 0.5 n 2 /{ [ ( p)]}ε = − + + γ ω α +β ϕ −ϕ −  . In turn, nu  is positive for  ˆ0 n n< < , 
and negative for ˆn n> , where  
2
1 2n̂ 0.5n 0.5 n 2 /{ [ ( p)]}= + + γ ω α +β ϕ −ϕ −  .                (15) 
This property is recalled in the construction of the phase-plane diagram in section 5. 
 
4. Royalties-based optimal control 
In the proposed framework, the number of broadcasters is indirectly controlled by the 
royalties per band set by the state to maximise the consumers’ utility over an infinite 
planning horizon. The public planner’s decision-problem is postulated as choosing the 




−ρ∫  subject to the state-equation (8) and the 
initial condition 0n(t 0) n= = , where 0ρ >  indicates the public planner’s time-
preference rate. The current-value Hamiltonian associated with this problem is: 
2
1 2
ˆ ˆŶ [ ( p)](Sn n ) (nr) [p(S n) c r ]= β + α +β ϕ −ϕ − −ω + γ + λφ −ω − − − πH ln          (16) 
where the time index is omitted for compactness and the co-state variable, λ , reflects 
the public planner’s current shadow value of the number of channels (i.e., broadcasts’ 
variety and competition).  
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     The second-order (curvature) condition for maximum requires the Hessian matrix 
of H  with respect to (n,r) to be negative semidefinite. This Hessian matrix is 
2
nn nr 1 2
2
rn rr
2 [ ( p)] / n 0
H
0 / r
 − ω α +β ϕ −ϕ − − γ 
= =    − γ   
H H
H H
.                   (17) 
Since rr 0<H  and nr rn0= =H H , Hdet  is positive and H is negative semidefinite as 
long as  
2
nn nn 1 2u 2 [ ( p)] / n 0= = − ω α +β ϕ −ϕ − − γ <H .               (18) 
This inequality requires the consumers’ marginal instantaneous utility from the 
number of channels (i.e., broadcasts) to be diminishing.  This curvature condition sets 
a lower bound on the number of broadcasters in the said optimally controlled 
industry:  
1 2n /{2 [ ( p)]} n> γ ω α +β ϕ −ϕ − ≡ .                (19)  
This lower bound rises with the ratio of the royalties-financed public good’s utility 
coefficient to the negative of the instantaneous utility loss from the decline in the 
marginal improvement in the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service induced by 
a rise in the number of broadcasters. As shown in the next sections, inequality (18) 
also helps identify the nature of the steady state and its comparative static properties. 
     If inequality (18) holds, the following conditions are sufficient: 
n nu ( p )λ = − +ρλ = − + ρ+ φ ω λ H                                       (20) 
r / r 0= γ −λφ =H                    (21) 
ˆn [p(S n) c r ]= φ −ω − − − π                   (22) 
t
t
lim e (t)n(t) 0−ρ
→∞
λ = .                   (23) 
     By differentiating (21) with respect to time and substituting (20) for λ , (21) for λ  
and (14) for nu , the Euler equation for the public planner’s optimal change in the 





r ( / )u r ( p )r
ˆ( / ){[ ( p)](S 2 n) / n}r ( p )r.
= φ γ − ρ+ φ ω
= φ γ α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ − ρ+ φ ω

             (24) 
The multiplication of both sides of this Euler equation by 1/r suggests that the optimal 
rate of change in the spectrum royalties is moderated by the public planner’s rate of 
time preference and the price of broadcasts’ quality. The optimal rate of change in the 
royalties rises with the consumers’ marginal direct utility from the broadcasts and 
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with the net effect of the broadcasts on the consumers’ aggregate income ( 1 2ϕ −ϕ ), 
proportionally to the  product of the consumers’ marginal utility from the private 
goods and the available broadcasting spectrum. 
 
5. Convergence to steady state 
In conjunction with the initial and tranversality conditions, the differential equation-
system (22) and (24) constitutes the solution to the aforesaid optimal control problem. 
The steady state (n*, r*)  of this system satisfies the following equalities: 
ˆr* p(S n*) c= −ω − − π                   (25) 
n
[( / ) p ]r*
u (n*)
γ ρ φ + ω
= .                            (26) 
In turn, the steady-state number of broadcasters under royalties-based optimal control 
satisfies the following equality: 
n
Ŝ [1 / ( p )] cn*
u (n*) p
 γ + ρ φ ω + π
= − + ω ω 
.                 (27) 
where Ŝ /ω  is the upper-bound number of channels. As the system’s probability of 
being in steady state at the beginning of the planning horizon is zero, it is sensible to 
investigate firstly the possibility of convergence to steady state, particularly from an 
industry with an initially small number of broadcasters. Once convergence to steady 
state is proven to be possible, the effects of the model parameters on the steady-state 
industry size indicated in (27) would be explored. 





pn (n*, r*) n (n*, r*)
r (n*, r*) r (n*, r*) ( / )u (n*)r * ( p )
−φ ω −φ  




.                (28) 
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are: 
                                                 
2 By differentiation, 
r ss ss 1 2 ss ss ss
ˆr (n , r ) 2( / ){[ ( p)](S 2 n ) / n }r ( p )= φ γ α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ − ρ+ φ ω .  
By setting r 0=  in (22), in steady state 
1 2 ss ss ss
ˆ( / ){[ ( p)](S 2 n ) / n }r ( p )φ γ α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ = ρ+ φ ω .  
Hence, 




1,2 nn0.5 4[ p ( p ) ( / )u (n*)]r *{ }
∆
µ = ρ± ρ + φ ω ρ+ φ ω − φ γ

.                        (29) 
In view of (18), ∆ ρ>  and, as 1 0µ >  and 2 0µ < , (n*, r*)  is a saddle point. The 
phase-diagram in the plane surrounding this steady state is constructed as follows. 
     By setting the right-hand side of equation (22) to zero and rearranging terms, the 
isocline n 0=  is linear and downwardly sloped (dr / dn p )= − ω . The isocline r 0=  is 
given by: 
n
( / )( p )r
u
γ φ ρ+ φ ω
= .                                       (30) 





( / )( p )udr 0
dn u=
γ φ ρ+ φ ω
= − > .                             (31) 






2( / )[u ( / n )u ]( p )d r
dn u=
γ φ − γ ρ+ φ ω
= .                           (32) 
Recalling that nu  is negative for ˆn n> , the numerator on the right-hand side of (32) 
is positive, whereas the denominator is negative, for ˆn n> . Hence, the isocline r 0=  
is concave for ˆn n> . Recalling that nu  is positive for ˆ0 n n< < , the isocline r 0=  
can be convex for sufficiently small values of n, as depicted in Figure 1. As 
rn (n*, r*) 0= −φ < , the horizontal arrows in the region above (below) the isocline 
n 0=  are pointed leftward (rightward). As the curvature condition requires that 
nnu (n*) 0< , 
2
n nnr (n*, r*) ( / )u (n*)r * 0= φ γ < . Therefore, the vertical arrows in the 
regions to the right (left) hand side of the isocline r 0=  are pointed downward 
(upward). 
      As can be seen from the phase-plane diagram (n*, r*)  is the only interior steady 
state. Convergence to (n*, r*)  can be along one of the two arms of the stable 
manifold. Starting from a highly regulated industry with a small number of 
broadcasters (i.e., 0n n n *< < ), the left upward sloped converging arm (indicated by 
solid arrows) is relevant for the public planner. Along this arm the number of 
broadcasters increases gradually despite the rising royalties. The public planner can 
let the broadcasting industry gradually approach the steady state along this arm by 
appropriate setting of the initial royalties followed by gradual increments. 
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Figure 1. Phase-plane diagram 
 
6. Comparative statics of the steady state 
The effects of the model parameters on the steady-state number of broadcasters are 
obtained by total differentiation of the equality obtained from (25) and (26) and in 
consideration of (14): 
1 2
nu (n*)
[( / ) p ]ˆV p(S n*) (c ) 0ˆ[ ( p)](S 2 n*) / n *
γ ρ φ + ω
≡ −ω − + π − =
α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ

.             (33) 




[( / ) p ]u (n*)dV p 0
dn * [u (n*)]
γ ρ φ + ω
= − ω< .                           (34)  
     The directions, but not the size, of the effects of some of the model parameters on 
the steady-state number of broadcasters are found to be independent of the model’s 
two central features: the opposite effects of variety and congestion on the quality of 
the broadcasting industry’s service and the opposite information-dissemination and 
effort-diversion effects of the quality of the industry service on the consumers’ 
income. Hence, within the confine of the outlined analytical framework, a change in 
any of these structural parameters affects the steady-state number of broadcasters in 
one, easily identifiable, direction. In particular, 1dn * /dc dn * /d (dV / dn*) 0−= π = <  
and 1dn * /dc dn * /d (dV / dn*) 0−= π = < . That is, the steady-state number of 
broadcasters decreases with the instantaneous operational cost of channels and with 
n 0=  




n *  




the normal profit attainable in other industries and increases with the size of the 
spectrum available to the broadcasting industry.  
     The directions of the effects of the rest of the model parameters on the steady-state 
number of broadcasters are found to be dependent on at least one of the aforesaid 
pairs of opposite effects. A rise in the effect of broadcasting industry’s service on 
aggregate output increases (reduces) the number of broadcasters in the new steady 
state if in the old steady state less (more) than half the spectrum carrying capacity was 
used so that the positive variety effect on the quality of the industry’s service 




ˆ(S 2 n*) [( / ) p ]
[u (n*)]dn * 0
d( ) dV / dn *
>
<






                                 (35) 
as ˆn * 0.5(S / ) n
<
>
= ω =  . 
     Also a rise in the consumers’ direct marginal instantaneous utility from the quality 
of the broadcasts increases (reduces) the number of broadcasters in the new steady 
state if in the old steady state the variety effect on the quality of the industry’s service 
dominated (was dominated by) the congestion effect: 
2
n
ˆ(S 2 n*) [( / ) p ]
[u (n*)]dn * 0
d dV / dn *
>
<






                                                 (36) 
as ˆn * 0.5(S / ) n
<
>
= ω =  . 
     The effect of the public planner’s rate of time preference on the steady-state 
number of broadcasters is negative (positive) as long as the consumers’ sum of direct 
and indirect marginal instantaneous utilities from the number of channels is positive 
(negative): 
nu (n*)dn * 0








                               (37) 
as nu (n*) 0
>
<
=  (i.e., as ˆn * n
<
>
= , where n̂  is given by (15)).               
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     The effect of the speed of adjustment to above-normal profit in the broadcasting 
industry on the steady-state number of broadcasters is positive (negative) as long as 
the consumers’ sum of direct and indirect marginal instantaneous utilities from the 
number of available channels is positive (negative): 
 
2
nu (n*)dn * 0








                             (38) 
as nu (n*) 0
>
<
=  (i.e., as ˆn * n
<
>
= ).               
     Narrowing the channels’ spectral bands does not necessarily increase the steady-
state number of channels. It is only clear that when less than half the spectrum’s 
carrying capacity is utilized ( Ŝ 2 n *> ω ) and the marginal effect of broadcasts on 
aggregate output is positive and exceeding the marginal revenue from the broadcasts’ 
quality ( 1 2 pϕ −ϕ > ), a reduction in the channels’ spectral width leads to a rise in the 




ˆ[ ( p)][(S 2 n*)p (( / ) p )2n*] p / n *pn *
[u (n*)]dn * 0
d dV / dn *
<
>






  (39) 
as 1 2 2
n




 α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + ρ φ + ω + γ +γ = 
  
.   
     With regard to the effect of the broadcast-quality price, it can only be clearly 
shown that the steady-state number of channels decreases with the broadcast quality 
price when the congestion effect dominates the variety effect (i.e., more than half the 
spectrum’s carrying capacity is utilized, Ŝ 2 n* 0− ω < ) and the information-
dissemination effect dominates the effort-diversion effect on aggregate output 




ˆ(S 2 n*){ [( / ) ( )] } / n * ˆ(S n*)
[u (n*)]dn * 0
dp dV / dn *
<
>
 − ω β ρ φ +ω ϕ −ϕ +ωα +ωγ





           (40) 
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 as  1 22
n




 − ω β ρ φ +ω ϕ −ϕ +ωα +ωγ γ − −ω = 
  
.              
     The steady-state number of channels increases (decreases) with the consumers’ 
marginal instantaneous utility from the private goods as long as 1 2 pϕ −ϕ −  and 




ˆ( p)(S 2 n*) [( / ) p ]
[u (n*)]dn * 0
d dV / dn *
>
<






                           (41) 
as 1 2 ˆ( p)(S 2 n*) 0
>
<
ϕ −ϕ − − ω = .   That is, if in the initial steady state the variety effect 
dominated (was dominated by) the congestion effect and also the difference between 
the information-dissemination effect and effort-diversion effect of the broadcasts’ 
quality on the consumers’ income is larger (smaller) than the quality price of 
broadcasts, then an increase in the marginal utility from the consumption of private 
goods increases (decreases) the number of broadcasters in the new steady state. 
     Almost in contrast to the claimed previous effect, the steady-state number of 
channels increases (decreases) with the consumers’ marginal instantaneous utility 
from the public good financed by the spectrum royalties as long as 




ˆ[( / ) p ][ ( p)](S 2 n*)
[u (n*)]dn * 0
d dV / dn *
>
<






              (42) 
as 1 2 ˆ[ ( p)](S 2 n*) 0
<
>
α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω = .         
  
7. Conclusion 
The advent of digital transmission technologies has done little to relieve the 
broadcasting industry’s spectrum constraint. The perennial trade-off between variety 
and reception prevails and is likely to be most prominent under a deregulatory 
scheme. Spectrum is a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. As in the 
case of any other state-owned natural resource, governments are entitled to charge 
royalties on its use and can direct these revenues to finance public services. Therefore, 
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in addition to the direct benefits from the service provided by the broadcasting 
industry, the indirect benefits to consumers from the public services financed by the 
royalties on this natural resource were taken into account in the determination of the 
optimal allocation of bands to broadcasters. For setting the state’s royalties on 
spectrum, we proposed an optimal control model that takes into account the aforesaid 
aspects, entry and exit of broadcasters in accordance with above-normal  profit and at 
a rate moderated by sunk costs, and possible positive and negative effects of 
broadcasts on consumers’ income. We derived the consumers’ inter-temporal utility 
maximizing steady-state of the broadcasting industry and its comparative statics and 
analyzed the possibility of convergence to this steady state. In contrast to the observed 
consolidation and return to concentration in the aftermath of past deregulatory 
reforms in OECD countries, our analysis reveals that the optimal control of the 
broadcasting industry with variable royalties on bands may gradually lead the industry 
to a steady state with a larger number of broadcasters.  
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